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Debian has a Security Team, made up of five members and two secretaries who handle security in the stable distribution. Handling security means they keep track of vulnerabilities that arise in software (watching forums such as bugtraq, or vuln-dev) and determine if the stable distribution is affected by it.
Also, the Debian Security Team, is the contact point for problems that are
coordinated by upstream developers or organizations such as CERT
which might affect multiple vendors.
That is, when problems are not Debian-specific. There are two contact points
with the Security Team:
team@security.debian.org
which only the members of the security team read.
security@debian.org
which
is read by all Debian developers (including the security team). Mails sent to
this list are not published in the Internet (it's not a public mailing list).
Sensitive information should be sent to the first address and, in some cases, should be encrypted with the Debian Security Contact key (key ID 363CCD95).
Once a probable problem is received by the Security Team it will investigate if
the stable distribution is affected and if it is, a fix is made for
the source code base. This fix will sometimes include backporting the patch
made upstream (which usually is some versions ahead of the one distributed by
Debian). After testing of the fix is done, new packages are prepared and
published in the security.debian.org
site so they can be
retrieved through apt
(see Execute a security update, Section
4.2). At the same time a Debian Security Advisory (DSA) is
published on the web site and sent to public mailing lists including debian-security-announce
and bugtraq.
Some other frequently asked questions on the Debian Security Team can be found at Questions regarding the Debian security team, Section 11.3.
Debian Security Advisories are made whenever a security vulnerability is discovered that affects a Debian package. These advisories, signed by one of the Security Team members, include information of the versions affected as well as the location of the updates and their MD5sums. This information is:
version number for the fix.
problem type.
whether it is remote or locally exploitable.
short description of the package.
description of the problem.
description of the exploit.
description of the fix.
DSAs are published both in Debian's
mainserver frontpage
and in the Debian security pages
.
Usually this does not happen until the website is rebuilt (every four hours) so
they might not be present immediately, the preferred channel is the
debian-security-announce mailing list.
Interested users can, however (and this is done in some Debian-related portals)
use the RDF channel to download automatically the DSAs to their desktop. Some
applications, such as Evolution
(an email client and personal
information assistant) and Multiticker
(a GNOME applet), can be
used to retrieve the advisories automatically. The RDF channel is available at
http://www.debian.org/security/dsa.rdf
.
DSAs published on the website might be updated after being sent to the public-mailing lists. A common update is adding cross references to security vulnerability databases. Also, translations [42] of DSAs are not sent to the security mailing lists but are directly included in the website.
Debian provides a fully crossreferenced
table
including all the references available for all the advisories
published since 1998. This table is provided to complement the reference map
available at CVE
.
You will notice that this table provide references to security databases such
as Bugtraq
,
CERT/CC Advisories
and US-CERT Vulnerability Notes
Database
as well as CVE names (see below). These references are
provided for convenience use, but only CVE references are periodically reviewed
and included. This feature was added to the website on June 2002.
One of the advantages of adding cross references to these vulnerability databases is that:
it makes Debian users easier to see and track which general (published) advisories have already been covered by Debian.
system administrators can learn more of the vulnerability and its impact by following the cross references.
this information can be used to cross-check output from vulnerability scanners that include references to CVE to remove false positives (see Vulnerability assessment scanner X says my Debian system is vulnerable!, Section 11.2.1).
Debian Security Advisories were declared
CVE-Compatible
[43]
in February 24, 2004.
Debian developers understand the need to provide accurate and up to date
information of the security status of the Debian distribution, allowing users
to manage the risk associated with new security vulnerabilities. CVE enables
us to provide standardized references that allow users to develop a CVE-enabled security
management process
.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE)
project is maintained by the MITRE Corporation and provides a
list of standardized names for vulnerabilities and security exposures.
Debian believes that providing users with additional information related to security issues that affect the Debian distribution is extremely important. The inclusion of CVE names in advisories help users associate generic vulnerabilities with specific Debian updates, which reduces the time spent handling vulnerabilities that affect our users. Also, it eases the management of security in an environment where CVE-enabled security tools -such as network or host intrusion detection systems, or vulnerability assessment tools- are already deployed regardless of whether or not they are based on the Debian distribution.
Debian started adding CVE names to DSAs since June 2002, and now provides CVE
names for all DSAs released since September 1998 after a review process started
on August 2002. All of the advisories can be retrieved on the Debian web site,
and announcements related to new vulnerabilities include CVE names if available
at the time of their release. Advisories associated with a given CVE name can
be searched directly through the search engine
.
Users who want to search for a particular CVE name can use the web search
engine available in debian.org to retrieve advisories available (in English and
translated to other languages) associated with CVE names. A search can be made
for a specific name (like advisory CAN-2002-0001
)
or for partial names (like all the 2002 candidates included in advisories
search for CAN-2002
).
Notice that you need to enter the word advisory together with the CVE name in
order to retrieve only security advisories.
In some cases you might not find a given CVE name in published advisories either because:
No Debian products are not affected by that vulnerability.
There is not yet an advisory covering that vulnerability (the security issue
might have been reported as a security
bug
but a fix has not been tested and uploaded)
An advisory was published before a CVE name was assigned to a given vulnerability (look for an update at the web site)
Since Debian is currently supported in a large number of architectures, administrators sometimes wonder if a given architecture might take more time to receive security updates than another. As a matter of fact, except for rare circumstances, updates are available to all architectures at the same time.
While previously the task to build security updates was done by hand, it is
currently not (as Anthony Towns describes in a
mail
sent to the debian-devel-announce mailing list dated 8th June
2002.)
Packages uploaded by the security team (to security.debian.org:/org/security.debian.org/queue/unchecked
or ftp://security.debian.org/pub/SecurityUploadQueue
)
with an appropriate patch are checked for signatures withing fifteen minutes of
being uploaded, once this is done they get added to the list of the
autobuilders (which no longer do a daily archive run). Thus, packages can get
automatically built for all architectures thirty minutes or an hour or
so after they're uploaded. However, security updates are a little more
different than normal uploads sent by package maintainers since, in some cases,
before being published they need to wait until they can be tested further, an
advisory written, or need to wait for a week or more to avoid publicizing the
flaw until all vendors have had a reasonable chance to fix it.
Thus, the security upload archive works with the following procedure (called "Accepted-Autobuilding"):
Someone finds a security problem.
Someone fixes the problem, and makes an upload to security.debian.org's incoming (this someone is usually a Security Team member but can be also a package maintainer with an appropriate fix that has contacted the Security Team previously). The Changelog includes a testing-security or stable-security as target distribution.
The upload gets checked and processed by a Debian system and moved into queue/accepted, and the buildds are notified. Files in here can be accessed by the security team and (somewhat indirectly) by the buildds.
Security-enabled buildds pick up the source package (prioritized over normal builds), build it, and send the logs to the security team.
The security team reply to the logs, and the newly built packages are uploaded to queue/unchecked, where they're processed by a Debian system, and moved into queue/accepted.
When the security team find the source package acceptable (i.e., that it's been correctly built for all applicable architectures and that it fixes the security hole and doesn't introduce new problems of its own) they run a script which:
installs the package into the security archive.
updates the Packages, Sources and Release files of security.debian.org in the
usual way (dpkg-scanpackages
, dpkg-scansources
...)
sets up a template advisory that the security team can finish off.
(optionally) forwards the packages to the appropriate proposed-updates so that it can be included in the real archive as soon as possible.
This procedure, previously done by hand, was tested and put through during the freezing stage of Debian 3.0 woody (July 2002). Thanks to this infrastructure the Security Team was able to have updated packages ready for the apache and OpenSSH issues for all the supported (almost twenty) architectures in less than a day.
This mail was sent by Wichert Akkerman to the Debian-devel-announce
mailing list
in order to describe Debian developer's behavior for
handling security problems in their packages. It is published here both for
the benefit of developers as well as for users to understand better how
security is handled in Debian.
Please note that the uptodate reference for this information is the Debian
Developer's Reference
, this section will be removed in the near
future.
If a developer learns of a security problem, either in his package or someone else's he should always contact the security team (at team@security.debian.org). They keep track of outstanding security problems, can help maintainers with security problems or fix them themselves, are responsible for sending security advisories and maintaining security.debian.org.
Please note that security advisories are only done for release distributions, not for testing, unstable (see How is security handled for testing and unstable?, Section 11.3.7) or older distributions (see I use an older version of Debian, is it supported by the Debian Security Team?, Section 11.3.8).
There are a few ways a developer can learn of a security problem:
he notices it on a public forum (mailing list, website, etc.):
someone files a bugreport (the Security tag should be used, or added by the developer)
someone informs him via private email.
In the first two cases the information is public and it is important to have a fix as soon as possible. In the last case however it might not be public information. In that case there are a few possible options for dealing with the problem:
if it is a trivial problem (like insecure temporary files) there is no need to keep the problem a secret and a fix should be made and released.
if the problem is severe (remote exploitable, possibility to gain root privileges) it is preferable to share the information with other vendors and coordinate a release. The security team keeps contacts with the various organizations and individuals and can take care of that.
In all cases if the person who reports the problem asks to not disclose the information that should be respected, with the obvious exception of informing the security team (the developer should make sure he tells the security team that the information cannot be disclosed).
Please note that if secrecy is needed the developer can also not upload a fix to unstable (or anywhere else), since the changelog information for unstable is public information.
There are two reasons for releasing information even though secrecy is requested/required: the problem has been known for too long, or the information becomes public.
The most important guideline when making a new package that fixes a security problem is to make as few changes as possible. People are relying on the exact behavior of a release once it is made, so any change made to it can possibly break someone's system. This is especially true of libraries: the developer must make sure he never changes the API or ABI, no matter how small the change.
This means that moving to a new upstream version is not a good solution, instead the relevant changes should be backported. Generally upstream maintainers are willing to help if needed, if not the Debian security team might be able to help.
In some cases it is not possible to backport a security fix, for example when large amounts of source code need to be modified or rewritten. If that happens it might be necessary to move to a new upstream version, but it should always be coordinated with the security team beforehand.
Related to this is another import aspect: developers must always test your change. If there is an exploit the developer should try if it indeed succeeds on the unpatched package and fails on the fixed package. The developer should try normal usage as well, sometimes a security fix can break normal use subtly.
Finally a few technical things for developers to keep in mind:
Make sure you target the right distribution in your debian/changelog. For stable this is stable-security and for testing this is testing-security. Do not target <codename>-proposed-updates.
Make sure the version number is proper. It has to be higher than the current package, but lower than package versions in later distributions. For testing this means there has to be a higher version in unstable. If there is none yet (testing and unstable have the same version for example) upload a new version to unstable first.
Do not make source-only uploads if your package has any binary-all packages. The buildd infrastructure will not build those.
Make sure when compiling a package you compile on a clean system which only has
package installed from the distribution you are building for. If you do not
have such a system yourself you can try a debian.org machine (see
http://db.debian.org/machines.cgi) or set up a chroot (the
pbuilder
and debootstrap
packages can be helpful in
that case).
After the developer has created and tested the new package it needs to be uploaded so it can be installed in the archives. For security uploads the place to upload to is ftp://security.debian.org/pub/SecurityUploadQueue/ .
Once an upload to the security queue has been accepted the package will automatically be rebuilt for all architectures and stored for verification by the security team.
Uploads waiting for acceptance or verification are only accessible by the security team. This is necessary since there might be fixes for security problems that cannot be disclosed yet.
If a member of the security team accepts a package it will be installed on security.debian.org as well as the proper <codename>-proposed-updates in ftp-master or non-US archive.
Security advisories are written and posted by the security team. However they certainly do not mind if a maintainer can supply (part of) the text for them. Information that should be in an advisory is described in Debian Security Advisories, Section 7.2.
This section could also be titled "how to upgrade/update safely your Debian GNU/Linux system" and it deserves its own section basically because it is an important part of the Security Infrastructure. Package signing is an important issue since it avoids tampering of packages distributed in mirrors and of downloads with man-in-the-middle attacks. Automatic software update is an important feature but it's also important to remove security threats that could help the distribution of trojans and the compromise of systems during updates [44].
As of today (May 2005) Debian does not provide signed packages for the distribution and the woody or sarge releases (3.0 or 3.1) do not integrate that feature. There is a solution for signed packages which will be, hopefully, provided in the next release (codename etch). This new feature is available in apt 0.6 (currently available in the sid distribution, see Apt-secure, Section 7.4.2).
This issue is better described in the Strong
Distribution HOWTO
by V. Alex Brennen.
The current scheme for package signature checking using apt
is:
the Release file includes the md5sum of Packages.gz (which contains the md5sums of packages) and will be signed. The signature is one of a trusted source.
This signed Release file is downloaded by 'apt-get update' and stored along with Packages.gz.
When a package is going to be installed, it is first downloaded, then the md5sum is generated.
The signed Release file is checked (signature ok) and it extracts from it the md5sum for the Packages.gz file, the Packages.gz checksum is generated and (if ok) the md5sum of the downloaded package is extracted from it.
If the md5sum from the downloaded package is the same as the one in the Packages.gz file the package will be installed otherwise the administrator will be alerted and the package will be left in cache (so the administrator can decide whether to install it or not ). If the package is not in the Packages.gz and the administrator has configured the system to only install checked packages it will not be installed either.
By following the chain of MD5 sums apt
is capable of verifying
that a package originates from a a specific release. This is less flexible
than signing each package one by one, but can be combined with that scheme too
(see below).
Currently, this scheme is fully
implemented
in apt 0.6 which is now available in the unstable
distribution for more information see Apt-secure, Section
7.4.2. Packages that provide a front-end to apt need to be modified to
adapt to this new feature, this is the case of aptitude
which has
been modified
to adapt to this scheme. Front-ends currently known to work properly with this
feature include aptitude
and synaptic
.
Package signing has been discussed in Debian for quite some time, for more
information you can read: http://www.debian.org/News/weekly/2001/8/
and http://www.debian.org/News/weekly/2000/11/
.
The apt 0.6 release includes apt-secure which is a tool that will
allow a system administrator to test the integrity of the packages downloaded
through the above scheme. This release includes the tool apt-key
for adding new keys to apt's keyring, which by default includes only the
current Debian archive signing key.
These changes are based on the patch for apt
(available in
Bug
#203741
) which provides this implementation.
This feature is still under development, if you believe you find bugs in this
please make first sure you are using the latest version (as this package might
change quite a bit before it is finally released) and, if running the latest
version, submit a bug against the apt
package.
Notice that, when using this apt version no extra effort should be required on
your part unless you use non-Debian sources, in which case an extra
confirmation step will be required by apt-get. This is avoided by providing
Release and Release.gpg files in the non-Debian sources. The Release file can
be generated with apt-ftparchive
(available in apt-utils 0.5.0 and
later), the Release.gpg is just a detached signature. To generate both follow
this simple procedure:
$ rm -f dists/unstable/Release $ apt-ftparchive release dists/unstable > dists/unstable/Release $ gpg --sign -ba -o dists/unstable/Release.gpg dists/unstable/Release
The additional scheme of signing each and every packages allows packages to be checked when they are no longer referenced by an existing Packages file, and also third-party packages where no Packages ever existed for them can be also used in Debian but will not be default scheme.
This package signing scheme can be implemented using debsig-verify
and debsigs
. These two packages can sign and verify embedded
signatures in the .deb itself. Debian already has the capability to do this
now, but implementing the policy and tools won't be started until after woody
releases.
Latest dpkg versions (since 1.9.21) incorporate a patch
that provides this functionality as soon as debsig-verify
is
installed.
NOTE: Currently /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg
ships with
"no-debsig" as per default.
NOTE2: Signatures from developers are currently stripped when they enter off the package archive since the currently preferred method is release checks as described previously.
In case you want to add now the additional security checks and don't want or cannot run the latest apt version (although we would really appreciate testing of it) you can use the script below, provided by Anthony Towns. This script can automatically do some new security checks to allow the user to be sure that the software s/he's downloading matches the software Debian's distributing. This stops Debian developers from hacking into someone's system without the accountability provided by uploading to the main archive, or mirrors mirroring something almost, but not quite like Debian, or mirrors providing out of date copies of unstable with known security problems.
This sample code, renamed as apt-check-sigs
, should be used in the
following way:
# apt-get update # apt-check-sigs (...results...) # apt-get dist-upgrade
First you need to:
get the keys the archive software uses to to sign Release files, http://ftp-master.debian.org/ziyi_key_2003.asc
and add them to ~/.gnupg/trustedkeys.gpg
(which is what
gpgv
uses by default).
gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring trustedkeys.gpg --import ziyi_key_2003.asc
remove any /etc/apt/sources.list
lines that don't use the normal
"dists" structure, or change the script so that it works with them.
be prepared to ignore the fact that Debian security updates don't have signed Release files, and that Sources files don't have appropriate checksums in the Release file (yet).
be prepared to check that the appropriate sources are signed by the appropriate keys.
This is the example code for apt-check-sigs
, the latest version
can be retrieved from http://people.debian.org/~ajt/apt-check-sigs
.
This code is currently in beta, for more information read http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2002/debian-devel-200207/msg00421.html
.
#!/bin/bash # Copyright (c) 2001 Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org> # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. rm -rf /tmp/apt-release-check mkdir /tmp/apt-release-check || exit 1 cd /tmp/apt-release-check >OK >MISSING >NOCHECK >BAD arch=`dpkg --print-installation-architecture` am_root () { [ `id -u` -eq 0 ] } get_md5sumsize () { cat "$1" | awk '/^MD5Sum:/,/^SHA1:/' | MYARG="$2" perl -ne '@f = split /\s+/; if ($f[3] eq $ENV{"MYARG"}) { print "$f[1] $f[2]\n"; exit(0); }' } checkit () { local FILE="$1" local LOOKUP="$2" Y="`get_md5sumsize Release "$LOOKUP"`" Y="`echo "$Y" | sed 's/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" if [ ! -e "/var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE" ]; then if [ "$Y" = "" ]; then # No file, but not needed anyway echo "OK" return fi echo "$FILE" >>MISSING echo "MISSING $Y" return fi if [ "$Y" = "" ]; then echo "$FILE" >>NOCHECK echo "NOCHECK" return fi X="`md5sum < /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE | cut -d\ -f1` `wc -c < /var/lib /apt/lists/$FILE`" X="`echo "$X" | sed 's/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" if [ "$X" != "$Y" ]; then echo "$FILE" >>BAD echo "BAD" return fi echo "$FILE" >>OK echo "OK" } echo echo "Checking sources in /etc/apt/sources.list:" echo "~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~" echo (echo "You should take care to ensure that the distributions you're downloading " echo "are the ones you think you are downloading, and that they are as up to" echo "date as you would expect (testing and unstable should be no more than" echo "two or three days out of date, stable-updates no more than a few weeks" echo "or a month)." ) | fmt echo cat /etc/apt/sources.list | sed 's/^ *//' | grep '^[^#]' | while read ty url dist comps; do if [ "${url%%:*}" = "http" -o "${url%%:*}" = "ftp" ]; then baseurl="${url#*://}" else continue fi echo "Source: ${ty} ${url} ${dist} ${comps}" rm -f Release Release.gpg lynx -reload -dump "${url}/dists/${dist}/Release" >/dev/null 2>&1 wget -q -O Release "${url}/dists/${dist}/Release" if ! grep -q '^' Release; then echo " * NO TOP-LEVEL Release FILE" >Release else origline=`sed -n 's/^Origin: *//p' Release | head -1` lablline=`sed -n 's/^Label: *//p' Release | head -1` suitline=`sed -n 's/^Suite: *//p' Release | head -1` codeline=`sed -n 's/^Codename: *//p' Release | head -1` dateline=`grep "^Date:" Release | head -1` dscrline=`grep "^Description:" Release | head -1` echo " o Origin: $origline/$lablline" echo " o Suite: $suitline/$codeline" echo " o $dateline" echo " o $dscrline" if [ "${dist%%/*}" != "$suitline" -a "${dist%%/*}" != "$codeline" ]; then echo " * WARNING: asked for $dist, got $suitline/$codeline" fi lynx -reload -dump "${url}/dists/${dist}/Release.gpg" >/dev/null 2>&1 wget -q -O Release.gpg "${url}/dists/${dist}/Release.gpg" gpgv --status-fd 3 Release.gpg Release 3>&1 >/dev/null 2>&1 | sed -n "s/^\[GNUPG:\] //p" | (okay=0; err=""; while read gpgcode rest; do if [ "$gpgcode" = "GOODSIG" ]; then if [ "$err" != "" ]; then echo " * Signed by ${err# } key: ${rest#* }" else echo " o Signed by: ${rest#* }" okay=1 fi err="" elif [ "$gpgcode" = "BADSIG" ]; then echo " * BAD SIGNATURE BY: ${rest#* }" err="" elif [ "$gpgcode" = "ERRSIG" ]; then echo " * COULDN'T CHECK SIGNATURE BY KEYID: ${rest %% *}" err="" elif [ "$gpgcode" = "SIGREVOKED" ]; then err="$err REVOKED" elif [ "$gpgcode" = "SIGEXPIRED" ]; then err="$err EXPIRED" fi done if [ "$okay" != 1 ]; then echo " * NO VALID SIGNATURE" >Release fi) fi okaycomps="" for comp in $comps; do if [ "$ty" = "deb" ]; then X=$(checkit "`echo "${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/binary-${arch}/Release" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`" "${comp}/binary-${arch}/Release") Y=$(checkit "`echo "${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/binary-${arch}/Packages" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`" "${comp}/binary-${arch}/Packages") if [ "$X $Y" = "OK OK" ]; then okaycomps="$okaycomps $comp" else echo " * PROBLEMS WITH $comp ($X, $Y)" fi elif [ "$ty" = "deb-src" ]; then X=$(checkit "`echo "${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/source/Release" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`" "${comp}/source/Release") Y=$(checkit "`echo "${baseurl}/dists/${dist}/${comp}/source/Sources" | sed 's,//*,_,g'`" "${comp}/source/Sources") if [ "$X $Y" = "OK OK" ]; then okaycomps="$okaycomps $comp" else echo " * PROBLEMS WITH component $comp ($X, $Y)" fi fi done [ "$okaycomps" = "" ] || echo " o Okay:$okaycomps" echo done echo "Results" echo "~~~~~~~" echo allokay=true cd /tmp/apt-release-check diff <(cat BAD MISSING NOCHECK OK | sort) <(cd /var/lib/apt/lists && find . -type f -maxdepth 1 | sed 's,^\./,,g' | grep '_' | sort) | sed -n 's/^> //p' >UNVALIDATED cd /tmp/apt-release-check if grep -q ^ UNVALIDATED; then allokay=false (echo "The following files in /var/lib/apt/lists have not been validated." echo "This could turn out to be a harmless indication that this script" echo "is buggy or out of date, or it could let trojaned packages get onto" echo "your system." ) | fmt echo sed 's/^/ /' < UNVALIDATED echo fi if grep -q ^ BAD; then allokay=false (echo "The contents of the following files in /var/lib/apt/lists does not" echo "match what was expected. This may mean these sources are out of date," echo "that the archive is having problems, or that someone is actively" echo "using your mirror to distribute trojans." if am_root; then echo "The files have been renamed to have the extension .FAILED and" echo "will be ignored by apt." cat BAD | while read a; do mv /var/lib/apt/lists/$a /var/lib/apt/lists/${a}.FAILED done fi) | fmt echo sed 's/^/ /' < BAD echo fi if grep -q ^ MISSING; then allokay=false (echo "The following files from /var/lib/apt/lists were missing. This" echo "may cause you to miss out on updates to some vulnerable packages." ) | fmt echo sed 's/^/ /' < MISSING echo fi if grep -q ^ NOCHECK; then allokay=false (echo "The contents of the following files in /var/lib/apt/lists could not" echo "be validated due to the lack of a signed Release file, or the lack" echo "of an appropriate entry in a signed Release file. This probably" echo "means that the maintainers of these sources are slack, but may mean" echo "these sources are being actively used to distribute trojans." if am_root; then echo "The files have been renamed to have the extension .FAILED and" echo "will be ignored by apt." cat NOCHECK | while read a; do mv /var/lib/apt/lists/$a /var/lib/apt/lists/${a}.FAILED done fi) | fmt echo sed 's/^/ /' < NOCHECK echo fi if $allokay; then echo 'Everything seems okay!' echo fi rm -rf /tmp/apt-release-check
You might need to apply the following patch for sid since
md5sum
adds an '-' after the sum when the input is stdin:
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ local LOOKUP="$2" Y="`get_md5sumsize Release "$LOOKUP"`" - Y="`echo "$Y" | sed 's/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" + Y="`echo "$Y" | sed 's/-//;s/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" if [ ! -e "/var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE" ]; then if [ "$Y" = "" ]; then @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ return fi X="`md5sum < /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE` `wc -c < /var/lib/apt/lists/$FILE`" - X="`echo "$X" | sed 's/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" + X="`echo "$X" | sed 's/-//;s/^ *//;s/ */ /g'`" if [ "$X" != "$Y" ]; then echo "$FILE" >>BAD echo "BAD"
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Securing Debian Manual
Version: 3.4, Thu, 27 Oct 2005 23:34:52 +0000jfs@debian.org