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Computes a branch of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence for n-person normal form games (as described [McKPal95]) and n-person extensive form games (as described in [McKPal98]).
This algorithm returns the last point computed. This algorithm computes the principal branch of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence. In this case taking the limit, as lambda goes to infinity, the quantal response equilibrium defines a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibrium for generic normal form games. Similarly, for extensive form games, it defines a selection from the set of sequential equilibria. Therefore, in extensive form games, this algorithm can be used to compute approximations to a sequential equilibrium.
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